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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendants agree with the Statement of Jurisdiction provided
by Plaintiff Gate City.

In further support thereof, Defendants

note that the Summary Judgment from which this appeal is taken was
entered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the Third District
Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, on April 28, 1989.
The

Court

certified

the

Judgment

as

final

pursuant

to

the

provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
since it did not address claims of certain Defendants, namely,
Jedd P. Jones, 0, Jay Call and Kenneth B. Colledge.

Gate City's

Notice of Appeal was timely filed on May 22, 1989.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Defendants respectfully submit that the Statement of Issues
on appeal provided by Plaintiff Gate City is unduly repetitive.
In the view of Defendants, the issues presented by this
appeal can be distilled to the following;
A.

Did

the

Agreements

Trial

Court

properly

in its determination

construe
that

they

the

Indemnity

satisfied

the

provisions in the promissory notes and trust deeds providing
for a release of Defendants?
B.

In so construing the documents, was there any issue of fact,
both material and necessary to the decision, which was truly
placed in dispute, by the competent submissions made to the
lower court?
-1-

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Defendants

submit that the only statute or rule whose

interpretation is determinative is Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
below, Defendants

For reasons explained more fully in Point VII.
submit that the provisions

of Utah Code

Annotated, section 57-15-8, dealing with the limitations placed
upon lenders regarding increasing interest rates upon transfer of
properties, have no bearing on the proper disposition of this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Beginning in about mid-1980 an entity known as Kilburn

Vacation-Homeshare, Inc. (hereinafter "Kilburn") sought properties
in the Park City area to develop as timeshare properties. During
1980 and early 1981, Gate City Mortgage Company provided long term
financing for several properties in the Park City area which
Kilburn then apparently assumed.

In connection therewith, Gate

City became familiar with Kilburn's status, financial condition,
and method of doing business.

See, e.g., Record at 1550, Cook

Deposition (11-21-88) at 30, 33, 34, 100 and 101.
2.

In the spring of 1981, Kilburn and Mr. Vaughn Cook,

Vaughn Cook & Associates and/or C.C.

International, companies

controlled by Cook, entered into a venture whereby Cook would
build and develop homes at Jeremy Ranch to be marketed as
timeshare units, and Kilburn would market and sell said units.

-2-

See, e.g., Record at 1550, Cook Deposition (11-21-88) at 30 and
deposition exhibits 6, 8 and 9.
3.

Upon being approached by Cook to provide long-term

financing, Gate City Mortgage Company and/or Gate City Federal
Savings and Loan Association (hereinafter "Gate City"J1 initially
declined to finance the project. Gate City anticipated difficulty
finding buyers for participation interests in the loans on the
secondary mortgage market because of the institutional nature of
the proposed borrower, either Kilburn or one of the Cook entities.
Record at 1550, Cook Deposition (11-15-88) at 47-48; Record at
1551, Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-21-88) at 63, 74 and 76, Vol.
II (12-19-88) at 161.
4.

Instead, Gate City suggested a scheme whereby Cook would

find individuals who would apply for loans in their own names so
the loans could be sold on the secondary market but with the
prearrangement among Gate City, Kilburn, Cook and the individuals
that the loan would be immediately assumed.

Record at 1551,

Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at 14, 16, 17, 45, 51, 52,

^-Cook negotiated with Gate City Mortgage Co., a
wholly owned subsidiary or affiliate of Plaintiff Gate
City Federal Savings and Loan Association. The mortgage
company made the loans, and immediately assigned the
Promissory Notes and Deeds of Trust which secured them
to Plaintiff Gate City Federal. For ease of reference,
since it makes no difference for purposes of this
appeal, Defendants use the short-hand reference "Gate
City" when referring to either entity.
-3-

63, 74-76, Record at 153, Vol. II (12-19-88) at 126, 151-153,
162-163, 210; Record at 1554, Cook Deposition (12-6-88) at 393.
5.

Cook obtained at least two loan commitments from Gate

City in the fall of 1981, which set forth the terms of the
proposed loans, including the annual interest rate of 18.75%. The
first of these commitments, dated September of 1981, is set forth
as Exhibit A to the Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, and may be
found in Appendix 1 to this brief.

Record at 1058-1059.

This

commitment was for a total amount of $2,200,000.00, which was
sufficient to cover the eleven (11) loans of $200,000.00 each,
which give rise to these consolidated lawsuits.

Record at 1550,

Exhibit "3" to Vaughn Cook Deposition.
6.

Cook

began

soliciting

individuals, including

these

Defendants, offering them a nominal consideration for temporary
use of their credit in securing such permanent financing with Gate
City. He represented to them that Gate City had approved the
procedure and each individual would receive a full and complete
release from any loan obligation in connection with, or shortly
after, execution of the loan documents and funding of the loan.
See solicitation letters from Cook to Defendants exemplified in
Appendix "H" to Gate City's brief. See, also, D. Smith Deposition
(4-12-88) at 104-105.
7.

During the application and processing phases of Gate

City's loan processing, Gate City turned much of the lending
process over to Cook, entrusting its forms and documents to Vaughn .
-4-

Cook who

supervised

their execution.

D. Jones

Deposition

(6-17-88) at 70-74; Record at 1553, Jenkins Deposition Vol. II
(12-19-88) at 165; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 114.
Some of the transactions were closed without a Defendant meeting
with, or even talking to, any agent of Gate City other than Cook
or an employee of one of Cook's companies.

E.g. , Crockett

Deposition (5-4-88) at 122; jRecord at 1551, Jenkins Deposition
Vol. I (11-15-88) at 55, 56, Vol. II (12-19-88) at 164, 165; D^.
Jones Deposition (6-17-88) at 74; Eyre Deposition (5-6-88) at
98-106.
8.

Each

Defendant

executed

a variable

interest

rate

Promissory Note payable to Gate City Mortgage and each Note was
secured by a Deed of Trust on one of the Jeremy Ranch improved
residential lots. A sample Note and Deed of Trust are set forth,
respectively, in Appendices 3 and 4 hereto. The respective Notes
and Trust Deeds are all identical in the pertinent particulars,
except of course as to dates (though all were executed in a sixweek period from late November 19 81 through the end of December or
early January of 1982), security (each loan was secured by a
different property in the same Jeremy Ranch subdivision), and the
names of the individuals appearing as borrowers (summarized in the
judgment appearing as Appendix "C" to Gate City's brief).

Gate

City prepared all of these instruments. Paragraph 10 of each Note
(which incorporates the language of Paragraph 17 of each Trust
Deed) states as follows:
-5-

Transfer of the Property; Assumption.
If all of any
part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written
consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien of
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the
creation of a purchase money security interest for
household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent
or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant
or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three
years or less not containing an option to purchase,
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and
payable.
Lender shall have waived such option to
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and
the person to whom the Property is to be sold or
transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit
of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of
Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If
Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in
this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's successor in
interest has executed a written assumption agreement
accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release
Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust
and the Note. (Emphasis added.)
Appendix 3 at Paragraph 10.
9.

Apparently,

so-called

"Indemnity

all

the

transactions

Agreement"

between

Gate

International, a corporate alter ego of Cook.
Agreements

have been

located, but

also

included

City

and

a
C.C.

Only nine Indemnity

it is unrefuted

that

all

transactions were handled with the identical documents^, Record
^Plaintiff Gate City itself admits in its own
submission in the form of an affidavit from Mr. Cook,
dated February 2, 1989, Record at 850, that Indemnity
Agreements were used in every loan transaction:
I [Cook] executed on behalf of C.C.
International
the
"Indemnity
Agreements"
between Gate City Mortgage Company and C.C.
International, (a representative copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and
-6-

at 1554, Cook Deposition (12-6-88) at 291; Spencer Deposition
(4-20-88) at 15 and 30; Smith Deposition (4-12-88) at 102-106.
Each "Indemnity Agreement" recites that a loan has been made to
CcCo International which corresponds by date, amount and security
to the notes and trust deeds executed by Defendants.

Cook's

company, C.C. International, agreed in those Indemnity Agreements
to pay or indemnify Gate City according to the terms of the
document.

These Indemnity Agreements were prepared by Gate City,

each of which contained identical language added to the regular
form pertaining to payment or indemnification of the mortgage.
Record

at

1047, 1052-1054, 1070-1079; Third

Cook Affidavit

(3-13-89) at Paragraphs 12 and 15 and Exhibit "E" thereto; Cook
Deposition, Exhibit 30.
10. A significant portion of the net proceeds from the
eleven loan transactions were used to pay Vaughn Cook and his

incorporated herein by this reference), for
the sole purpose of indemnifying Gate City
Mortgage Company for any liability arising
from mechanics' liens and/or materialmens'
liens on the subject 11 homes and lots in the
Jeremy Ranch Subdivision which were built
under my direction and supervision. (Emphasis
added.)
See, also, Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook dated March
13, 1989, at paragraphs 12-14, Record at 1051 and 1052.
Nevertheless, only nine of the eleven "Indemnity
Agreements" have been located to date. These nine are
set forth in Exhibit 30 to the Deposition of Vaughn R.
Cook (12-6-88), Record at 1554, and are reproduced in
Exhibit "E" to the Third Cook Affidavit, which is
Appendix 1 to this brief. Record at 1070-1079.
-7-

subcontractors and suppliers for the construction of the eleven
subject homes in Jeremy Ranch. Record at 1051, Third Affidavit of
Vaughn Cook, Paragraph 11, Appendix 1 hereto.
11. It is not contested that at or shortly before each loan
closing, the property securing that loan was conveyed by Cook, or
by an entity he controlled, typically C.C. International, to the
respective defendant(s), so that they could then pledge the same
to Gate City as security on the corresponding promissory note.
Record at 1050, Paragraph 7 of Third Cook Affidavit (Appendix 1
hereto). See, also. Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. I
(11-21-88) at 165, 166; Ray Fisher Deposition (4-13-88) at 31, 32.
12. At the loan closing, Defendants executed Uniform Real
Estate Contracts reconveying the Property to C.C. International,
one of Cook's companies.

Those contracts included language

whereby C.C. International agreed, inter alia, (i) to take the
properties subject to Gate City's mortgage, and (ii) to assume
those mortgages and in some cases assume or cause them to be
assumed by any subsequent buyer (Cook testified this would be
Kilburn).

At the same time, or not long thereafter, Defendants

also executed warranty deeds (never recorded) which would have
transferred the same property to Alta Title, Trustee, apparently
in trust for Kilburn.

Record at 1050-1051, 1053-1054 and 1080-

1088, Paragraphs 7-10, 15 and Exhibit "F" of Third Cook Affidavit
(Appendix 1 hereto).

-8-

13 • Paragraph 10 of the Notes contains a due-on-sale clause.
See Appendix 3 to this brief .
14. Defendants were consistently and repeatedly told by
Cook, before and at closings, that they were transferring the
respective properties without on-going personal liability on the
transactions.

E.g., D. Jones Deposition (6-17-88) at 62.

Gate

City knew such representations were being made and in some cases
witnessed the representations being made without ever attempting
to deny or disavow the representations.

Record at 1551, Jenkins

Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at 23, 24, Record at 1553, Vol. II
(12-19-88) at 164; Stephen Blaser Deposition (4-26-88) at 47-56,
in Appendix 7.
15. Following the closings, Gate City sent nothing to the
named borrowers, Defendants, but rather, consistent with the
representations made concerning the assumptions of the loans, sent
all of the• loan payment materials, notices of interest rate
changes, and similar notices to Kilburn or to Alta Title which was
handling

collection of payments from the sale of Kilburn's

timeshareis.

All payments made to Gate City on the subject loans

were made by or for Kilburn.

Record at 1550, Cook Deposition

(11-21-88) at 166 and 167; Record at 1553, Jenkins Deposition Vol.
II (12-19-88) at 162, 163; Record at 1433, James Clark Affidavit,
Paragraph 8, Appendix 5 hereto.
16. It is undisputed that after the loan closings with
Defendants and their transfers of respective properties, Gate City
-9-

made no effort to communicate with these Defendants for over two
years, took no action to inform Defendants as to variable interest
rate changes and at no time attempted to accelerate the loan based
upon a transfer to Cook or Kilburn. Pusey Deposition (4-5-88) at
95; Crockett Deposition (5-4-88) at 59.
17. From the time of the transfers and loan closings, and
for over two years thereafter, each defendant continued to believe
and understand that he had been released from any and all
obligations under the loan documents.

E.g., Blaser Deposition

(4-26-88) at 91-93; Fisher Deposition (4-13-88) at 88.
18.

In June 1984, two and one-half years after the loan

closings and property transfers, after the real estate market had
fallen precipitously in Summit County, and after Kilburn and Cook
had defaulted, Plaintiff Gate City for the first time demanded
payment from these Defendants.
Affidavit at Paragraph 8;

Record at 577; Blaise Johnson

Pusey Deposition (4-5-88) at 95;

Crockett Deposition (5-4-88) at 59.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was presented with competent evidence, not
disputed in any material way, showing that the conduct of the
parties

indicated

that

all

parties

to

the

subject

loan

transactions, understood going into the transactions that they
were to be assumed and later treated those transactions as though
they had been assumed, until the loans went into default in late
spring of 1984, over two years after the loans were closed. There
is no dispute that the notes and trust deeds provide for a release
of the borrowers upon certain conditions beng met.

Gate City

contends that Defendants are not released due to an incomplete
compliance with a technical provision of the promissory notes and
deeds of trust.

Defendants submit that the technical provision

(written acceptance of the assumption) is adequately satisfied by
Gate City's acceptance of the Indemnity Agreements, which Gate
City also promulgated.
Second, the trial court correctly construed the Indemnity
Agreements.

Those agreements are not ambiguous on their face. A

review of the four corners of each agreement, taking into account
all of the language contained therein, is consistent with the
trial court's determination that they reflect an assumption of the
loans by C.C. International.

Gate City's proposed variant

interpretations do not adequately square with the language of the
Indemnity Agreements themselves.

-11-

Third, the conduct of the parties did not create ambiguity.
The

lower court

had presented

to

it substantial

concerning the setting of the Indemnity Agreements.
showed

that

the

written

assumption

of

the

submissions
That evidence

loans

by

C.C.

International was consistent with the expectations of the parties
and their actions.

Gate City failed to raise any issue of fact

truly material to the proper determination of Defendants' Motion
for Summary

Judgment, which was

competently

disputed

in the

materials presented to the trial court.
Fourth, the Uniform Real Estate Contracts between Defendants
and C.C. International are consistent with C.C. International's
assumption of the loans.

The documents entitled

"Assumption

Agreement" to which Gate City points in an attempt to raise a
contradiction, carry

no weight.

Those

documents

were

never

completed and were never delivered to or accepted by Gate City.
Fifth,

C.C.

International's

intent

to

assume

the

loan

obligations is adequately manifested by the Uniform Real Estate
contracts it signed.

Gate City's intent to allow such assumptions

is manifested by the documents

it prepared

and accepted, in

writing, including the Notes and Indemnity Agreement.
Sixth, the lower court's decision is not dependent upon a
determination of any disputed material fact.
Seventh, the operative documents, all drafted by Gate City,
do

satisfy

the

requirements

of

a

release.

The

Indemnity

Agreements satisfy the provision of a written assumption of the
-12-

loan obligations accepted by Gate City. The notes and trust deeds
do not limit the manner in which Gate City's option to accelerate
may be waived.

Gate City's conduct, at the time of the

transactions, and thereafter, clearly evidences a waiver of any
right of acceleration. Therefore, the Indemnity Agreements, which
manifest Gate City's acceptance of C.C.

International as an

assuming party, adequately fulfill all remaining provisions for
the release of the Defendants.
Finally, the Summary Judgment awarded by the trial court in
favor of Defendants should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
CONSTRUING THE DOCUMENTS.
There is little doubt but that everyone, including Gate City,
intended, believed and understood there had been assumptions of
the loans and acted as though the assumptions had been completed,
at least until some time in 1984, over two years after the loans
were closed.

It is undisputed that during this period all

payments came from Kilburn, and that Gate City sent Kilburn and
Alta Title all information pertaining to the status of the loans,
including payment requests and notices of changes in the interest
rate.

Record at 1433, Clark Affidavit at Paragraph 8, Appendix 5

hereto.

But then, when the loans went into default, Gate City

sought to back-track from its conduct and sought to rely upon a
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technicality in the language of the Notes and Deeds of Trust to
the effect that for there to be a release, the assumption had to
be accepted
therefore,

in writing by Gate City.
that

Gate

City

be

held

It is only

to

the

other

fitting,
technical

provisions of its own documents.
During the discovery process, Defendants learned that Gate
City had executed Indemnity Agreements whereby Gate City accepted
and

agreed

to

the

assumption

of

the

subject

loans

by

C.C.

International, an entity controlled by Vaughn Cook, the person
principally responsible for negotiating the terms of the loans
with Gate City and the person to whom Gate City made the loan
commitment before the loans were closed.
Gate City claims that its Indemnity Agreement means nothing
vis a vis the mortgage despite the specially-added language of its
own creation to the contrary.

On the other hand, Gate City is

quick to accuse Defendants of sleight-of-hand, illusion, or other
forms of magic or deception.

In making such accusations Gate

City, must ask this Court to disregard the fact that Gate City
drafted the very documents it ridicules.

It must convince the

Court to disregard language which was added to the boiler-plate
form, apparently especially for these particular transactions.
Defendants'

arguments,

which

Gate

City

ridicules,

were

carefully considered by the trial court, not once, but at two
separate hearings, with the lower court having the advantage of
lengthy briefs, affidavits and depositions.
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The Court took time

to deliberate on the presentations and both times concluded that
Gate City had relinquished its claims against Defendants by virtue
of having accepted the assumption of the loans. Defendants submit
the material facts of this case are not in dispute and that the
trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defendants
were entitled to Summary Judgment.
II.
THE TERMS OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS
ARE NOT AMBIGUOUS.
A.

The Indemnity Agreements are not Ambiguous on their Face.
Gate City argues that this Court need only find that the

language of the controlling documents is subject to differing
interpretations in order to reverse the lower court's ruling.
Gate City's brief at 12. In doing so, Gate City apparently does
not dispute the fact that each Note and Trust Deed provides, in
unambiguous

terms, for a release

of

the original

borrower

(Defendants) when a transfer is made, acceleration is waived, the
assuming party executes a written assumption agreement, and Gate
City accepts the assumption in writing.

Note, Paragraph 10,

Appendix 3 hereto.
Gate City argues, rather, that its own Indemnity Agreement is
ambiguous. Defendants submit that the form is not ambiguous.
The beginning point for analysis of the Indemnity Agreements
at issue is the long-settled rule of looking first to the four
corners of the agreement to determine the intentions of the

-15-

parties., Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist,
773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). As the Utah Supreme Court, in Ron Case
Roofing, reaffirmed, M[t]he use of extrinsic evidence is permitted
only if the document appears to incompletely express the parties'
agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement."
Id. at 1385.
Each Indemnity Agreement recites that C.C. International "has
obtained from the Party of the Second Part [Gate City Mortgage
Company] a first mortgage loan for the principal balance of
$200,000.00," followed by a description of the particular property
that secures this loan.

Icl. Because the property description in

each Indemnity Agreement, the date and the amount thereof, all
correspond identically with the same details of each subject
promissory note, it is evident that the loans being referred to in
the Indemnity Agreements can be none other than the same loans
made nominally and originally to Defendants.
that C.C.

Removing all doubt

International is the new mortgagor, each Indemnity

Agreement states that C.C. International has obtained a mortgage
from Gate City.
The next following language in each Indemnity Agreement
relates to the fact that each property may be subject to
mechanics * or materialmens' liens and that the parties contemplate
not showing exceptions for such liens in making the mortgage. The
document then goes on to state the responsibilities of
International to pay or indemnify against such liens.
-16-

C.C.

The final substantive paragraph of each one-page Indemnity
Agreement then recites as follows:
Party of the First Part [C.C. International] agrees upon
demand to indemnify Party of the Second Part [Gate City
Mortgage Company] for any loss, including, but not
limited to, amounts paid in discharge of the lien,
expenses of investigation, preparation for litigation,
judgment, court costs, and attorney's fees it may
sustain by reason of omitting to set out such lien(s) as
an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or by
reason of enforcement of this agreement. The obligation
of the Party of the First Part [C.C. International] in
this agreement shall extend to the mortgage executed by,
through or for the Party of the First Part [C.C.
International] of assigns on the above premises.
(Underlined portion represents typewritten addition in
original.)
Most of the above quoted material is part of the pre-printed form.
All of the second sentence in this quoted paragraph has been
specially added in typewritten form.
Defendants respectfully submit that the language in the last
sentence quoted, above to the effect that C.C.
obligation to pay or indemnify

International's

"shall extend to the mortgage

executed by, through or for" C.C. International.

This obligation

is consistent with the beginning of the document which describes
C.C. International as having obtained a mortgage from Gate City.
This agreement by C.C. International to pay the mortgage and
indemnify Gate City is a further expression of the fact that C.C.
International is assuming each such loan referred to.

No other

portion of the document relating to payment and indemnification of
mechanics' liens is inconsistent with this conclusion.
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Finally, each Indemnity Agreement is signed by Vaughn Cook
for C.C* International and by Stanley F. Jenkins, Gate City's loan
officer on each loan, for Gate City Mortgage Company, thereby
satisfying the final requirement of Paragraph 10 of the Note that
the assumption be accepted in writing by Gate City.
To paraphrase the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the
Ron Case Roofing Opinion, at 1386, whatever the legal consequences
of this language, it is plain and unambiguous.

There is nothing

in the other provisions of the Indemnity Agreement that would
undermine the effect of this quoted material.

This Court should

find, therefore, as a matter of law, that each Indemnity Agreement
unambiguously expresses the conclusion that Gate City Mortgage
Company agreed to C.C. International's assumption of each loan
referred to in each Indemnity Agreement.
B.

Gate City's Proposed Alternative Interpretations Lack Support
in the Agreements and Record.
Declining to discuss the provision at the beginning of each

Indemnity Agreement which states clearly that C.C.

International

has obtained the mortgage, Gate City contends that the Indemnity
Agreement is ambiguous simply because it is supposedly subject to
other interpretations.

Each of Gate City's so-called "reasonable

interpretations" requires the Court to strain the meaning of the
specially added typewritten language, pretend that it does not
exist, or assume that this added language was intended to add
nothing to the obligations of C.C. International to Gate City.
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Gate City claims this typewritten language could mean that
CeCc

International's obligations to indemnify Gate City from

mechanic's liens "shall extend to the above mentioned mortgage,
meaning that C.C. International's duty to indemnify runs not to
the owner of the property, but rather to the holder of the
security interest."

(emphasis added).

Gate City's brief at 15.

Gate City's interpretation would require the Court to ignore that
this meaning existed before the addition of the added language.
Gate City further claims that the Court could conclude that
the paragraph means the obligation to pay and to indemnify runs
with the land. This interpretation fails to explain why Gate City
drafted language stating that the obligation to pay and indemnify
"shall extend to the mortgage."
The final "reasonable interpretation" offered by Gate City is
that the language means that

"C.C. International's

duty to

indemnify from mechanics' liens extends to the mortgage executed
by Defendants as assigns of C.C. International."

Defendants are

hard pressed to explain how this interpretation differs from the
ruling of the lower court.

In any event, Defendants simply note

the fact that the language of the Indemnity Agreement expressly
states that the mortgage was "executed by, through, or for" C.C.
International.
Each of Gate City's interpretations utterly fail to explain:
1.

Why C.C. International signed the Indemnity Agreement in
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the first place.

(If/ however, it was assuming the mortgage, it

makes perfect sense.)
2.

Why C.C. International is described in the Agreements as

having "obtained" a mortgage from Gate City.
3.

Why

C.C.

International

desired

the

mortgage

to

be

executed without showing an exception for possible liens.
4.
against

Why C.C. International was willing to pay and indemnify
mechanics

liens

and

why

Gate

City

expected

C.C.

International to do it.
5.

If not an obligor on the mortgage, how execution of the

Agreement by C.C. International would "benefit" it in the "conduct
of its business" as recited in the Agreements.
6.

What end was to be accomplished by adding specially

drafted language to the form which states that C.C. International
will pay and indemnify as to the mortgage in the same manner it
will the liens.
7.

Gate

City's

"reasonable

interpretations"

fail

to

explain, why the document states that the mortgage was "executed
by, through or for" C.C. International.

(Defendants have always

maintained that the mortgages were not executed on their own
behalf, but rather were in fact executed by, through or for the
benefit of C.C. International.
Gate City simply has not met these issues.
Gate City also attempts to argue that the specially added
language referring to "mortgages" is ambiguous.
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Gate City claims

that the document is ambiguous because only trust deeds were
executed—not "mortgages."

This argument ignores the fact that

under Utah law, a trust deed may be treated as a mortgagee

Indeed

in each case the trust deed was treated as a mortgage and
judicially foreclosed.

Furthermore, Gate City's own preferred

"Assumption Agreement" form refers to these very trust deeds as
"mortgages."

Record at 1009-1020, contained in Appendix "E" to

Gate City's brief;

Cf.

Record at 1452-1473, in Exhibit "C" to

Appendix 5 of Defendants' brief; and, Argument on pages 28 and 29,
below.
The

foregoing

shows

that

the

only

truly

reasonable

interpretation of the Indemnity Agreement is that found by the
lower court.

Its award of summary judgment to Defendants should

be affirmed.
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III.
THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES DOES
NOT CREATE AMBIGUITY.
A.

All Parties Knew that Loan Assumptions were Intended, and
Later Acted as Though They had been Accomplished.
Def smdants'

Statement

of

Facts makes

it clear

that

all

parties entered into the loan transactions with the belief that
the loans would be assumed.

Vaughn Cook could not have persuaded

the Defendants to help in obtaining the financing for Jeremy Ranch
property without such promises.
Deposition

Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook

(11-21-88) at 83; Record at 1548, W. Truman Ribgy

Deposition at 29 and 35; R. John Eyre Deposition, at 45-51.

Cook

discussed

Stan

this

assumability

feature

of

the

loans

with

Jenkins, Gate City's loan officer, in advance of the closings.
Record at 1550, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. I at 54. Stan Jenkins
was a witness

on at least some occasions

at closings

where

Defendants were told again that the loan would be assumed, and
Mr. Jenkins did not refute this.

E.g., Blaser Depositon at 47,

49, 52-54; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 21, 24-25;
Record at 1551, Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (11-15-88) at 44-66.
Stan Jenkins, in connection with the closing of the loan to John
Forrester, Jr. and others, even agreed with Cook to carry a
Uniform Real Estate Contract to Forrester for signature which
recited that C.C. International, as entity Cook owned or otherwise
controlled, would assume or cause the mortgage loan from Gate City
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to be assumed.

Record at 1050-1051, Third Cook Affidavit,

Paragraphs 9-10 (set out in Appendix 1 hereto).
B.

No disputed Issues of Material fact were Properly Raised or
Presented to the Trial Court.
In reaching its decision that each Indemnity Agreement

represented a loan assumption, the lower court had the benefit of
not only the Indemnity Agreements themselves, but also facts
explaining the context and circumstances surrounding the Indemnity
Agreements as presented by the parties in their respective
memoranda and supporting affidavits.

Record at 703, 709, 838,

975, 1047, 1089 and 1430. A careful review of the trial court's
minute order of February 15, 1989, the transcript of both hearings
held on this issue and the judgment of the lower court, reveals
that the it affirmatively and carefully considered all of the
submissions offered in reaching its decision that each Indemnity
Agreement constituted a loan assumption. It can only be concluded
that the trial court failed to find any sufficient or adequate
evidence of a material fact that was genuinely in dispute.
Defendants submit that a review of the record supports the lower
court's conclusion.
Gate City devotes much of its brief to try to persuade the
Court that the Indemnity Agreements are ambiguous, without ever
adequately showing that any fact material to the judgment of the
trial court is truly disputed.

Defendants submit that there are

no such disputed facts.
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Gate City argues that
understood,

intended

and

"when all parties to a writing
treated

[a writing]

as

something

inconsistent with its express terms, that creates an ambiguity
that must be resolved by parol evidence . . . ."

Plaintiff's

brief at 18-19. In further addressing this claim, Gate City fails
to consider the conduct of "all" of the parties, ignores certain
submissions considered by the trial court and misstates certain
other factual points.
The evidence is undisputed that:

Indemnity Agreements were

drafted by Gate City and signed by its loan officer, Stanley
Jenkins. Record at 1553, Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition Vol. II
(12-19-88) at 175; Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition (2-18-86) at 86;
Record at 1052, Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook at Paragraph 12.
Gate City never produced any submission or statement by the person
responsible for adding the subject typewritten language dealing
with indemnity and payment of the mortgage which appears toward
the end of each Indemnity Agreement or anyone who could even
recall its inclusion in the Agreements.
The only effort Gate City made in an attempt to create the
appearance of a disputed fact to the Court below was to submit two
affidavits of one Blaise Johnson, currently in the employ of Gate
City. Mr. Johnson claimed that normally Gate City did not effect
assumptions by using a document like the Indemnity Agreements
here. Record at 829 and 960. Mr. Johnson fails to address any of
the language expressly added to the Indemnity Agreement and
-24-

obviously knows nothing about the facts and circumstances of its
inclusion in the Indemnity Agreement.

Not only are those

affidavits lacking in foundation with regard to the intent of the
drafter of the language, but the substance of the affidavits is
conclusory. Id.
In an almost identical situation, the Utah Court of Appeals
recently held that such an affidavit is meaningless.

G. Adams

Limited Partnership v. Durbano, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (Utah
Ct. App., November 8, 1989) ("In essence, the facts detailed in
Plaintiffs' affidavits remained uncontroverted for purposes of
Utah R. Civ. P. 56, and judgment for Plaintiffs, on the record
before the Court, was appropriate.

See, e.g., Williams v. Melby,

699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985).

('An affidavit which merely

reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails
to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of
fact.').").

Defendants submit that the affidavits of Blaise

Johnson, Record at 575, 829 and 958, fail in the same manner and
should be entirely disregarded on the point of what was intended
by the Indemnity Agreements.
C.

Evidence Submitted to the Trial Court by Defendants Supported
the Court's Finding of Loan Assumptions.
By contrast, the submissions of Defendants support the trial

court's

conclusion

that

loan assumptions were

effected.
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intended

and

1.

Gate City suggested the scheme to Cook in the first

instance. Record at 1551, Jenkins Deposition Vol. I (11-15-88) at
14, 16. 17, 45, 51, 52, 63, 74-76, Record at 153, Vol. II (12-1988) at 126, 151-153, 162-163, 210; REcord at 1554, Cook Deposition
(12-6-88) at 393.
2.

Gate City acknowledges all of the Defendants were

expecting these loans to be quickly assumed.

Record at 1553,

Stanley F. Jenkins Deposition Vol. II (12-19-88) at 162, 211, 225,
236.
3.

Gate City also acknowledges Vaughn Cook testified that

these loans were to be assumed, and Mr. Cook stated that he
understood this assumption might well take place in two parts.
Record at 1554, Vaughn Cook Deposition Vol. II
(12-6-88) at 274.
4.

Vaughn Cook prepared and executed Uniform Real Estate

Contracts whereby Defendants agreed to convey the respective
properties back to C.C. International. Record at 1050-1051, 10611068.
5.

In each Uniform Real Estate Contract between one or more

of the Defendants and C.C. International, C.C. International, as
buyer, agreed to take the property subject to the new mortgage in
favor of Gate City, and C.C. International further agreed either
"to assume, or cause the same to be assumed by any subsequent
buyer," or agreed "to assume full liability thereunder and cause
the same to be assumed by subsequent buyers."
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Id. The intent of

C.C. International to assume these mortgage loans from Gate City
could not be more clearly evidenced than by those documents
executed

essentially

contemporaneously

with

the

Indemnity

Agreements•
6.

As stated in Paragraphs 15-18 of the Statement of Facts

above, after the loan closings in late 1981 until the loans went
into default in 1984, Gate City communicated exclusively with
Cook, Kilburn or Alta Title concerning all aspects of the loans,
accepted payment from them and totally ignored and failed to
communicate with Defendants, reinforcing their belief that the
promised assumptions had occurred.
Defendants submit these facts and circumstances show that the
intent and understandings of the parties was consistent with the
lower Court's ruling. Gate City's response to these circumstances
raises no issue of a material nature that would require a trial to
determine.
D,

Gate City's Supposed Factual Inconsistencies Do Not Survive
Careful Scrutiny.
While it is true that Defendants were expecting the loan

assumptions to be made by Kilburn, this is not inconsistent with
an earlier interim assumption by C.C. International.
Deposition at 125-129, attached as Appendix 7.

S. Blaser

Mr. Cook had

solicited Defendants' participation in these arrangements with the
representation that Defendants would be released of liability by
virtue of assumptions to take place.
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See, e.g., letters from

Vaughn Cook to Defendants set out in Appendix H to Gate City's
brief.
Responding
contentions

more

particularly

set out at pages

to

the

twelve

numbered

22-25 of Gate City's brief,

Defendants submit, adopting Gate City's numbering, that those
points are misleading or erroneous for the following reasons:
1.

Gate City's reliance upon the first Affidavit of Vaughn

Cook, drafted by counsel for Gate City, ignores the existence of
the Uniform Real Estate Contracts described above, which expressly
set

forth

an

intent

and

obligation

on

the part

International to assume the loan obligations.

of

C.C.

In his third

affidavit, reproduced in Appendix 1 to Respondent's brief, at
Paragraphs 15-16, Cook clarifies and explains the misleading
portions of the first affidavit.

Gate City's reliance upon the

first affidavit without the clarification is unfair.
2.

Gate City's reliance upon the pages of Cook's deposition

it cited shows not only that the testimony does

not support the

contentions for which they are cited, but in fact, at page 167 of
Cook's deposition, Record at 1550, Cook stated that the loan
"assumptions were to take place effective immediately and the
payments were to be made by Kilburn."
3-4. The "Assumption Agreements" referred to by Gate City at
pages 22-23 of its Brief and set forth as an attachment to Cook's
Second Affidavit, also drafted by counsel for Gate City, were
produced during discovery from the files of Jim Clark, the
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued

principal of Kilburn,

There is no evidence that they ever were

delivered to, or even seen by, Gate City,

In fact, Gate City has

consistently contended that such loan assumptions by Kilburn were
never completed or approved by Gate City. More complete copies of
these

same

documents,

including

the

reverse

sides,

never

completed, which were omitted by Gate City in preparing Cook's
second affidavit, were included with Jim Clark's Affidavit, set
forth in Appendix 5

hereto.

Gate City's reliance upon the

language of a document which never became fully executed and which
it never saw is misplaced.

Moreover, the language relied upon by

Gate City is inconsistent with the language in Paragraph 10 of the
Promissory Notes.
5-7. Defendants do not dispute that they and Cook believed,
from before the loan closings and into 1984, that ultimately
thesesubject loans were to be or had been fully assumed by Kilburn
with a corresponding release to Defendants. However, none of this
negates an earlier interim assumption of the loans by C.C.
International.
hereto.

See, Blaser Deposition excerpts in Appendix 7

The fact that Cook was not fully aware in 19 84 of the

legal effect of the Indemnity Agreements he signed in 19 81
concerning C.C. International's assumption of the loans, also does
not detract from the effectiveness of those Indemnity Agreements.
This is explained in part by the fact that Gate City never told
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued

Cook of this effect of the Indemnity Agreements and never
presented claims against or to Cook or C.C. International,
apparently because the mechanics' liens never materialized or were
satisfi€*d by Cook, and because by 1984, Gate City apparently
realized the futility of trying to collect money from Cook or C.C.
International,

which

by

approaching that status.

then

were

judgment-proof

or

fast

See, also, Paragraphs 15-16 of Cook's

Third Affidavit set forth in Appendix 1 hereto. However, had Gate
City timely asserted its rights against C.C. International for
payment of the subject loans, one can be sure that Gate City would
not so willingly have accepted Cook's assertion he did not know
that by signing the Indemnity Agreements, his company had become
liable on the loans.
8.

Again, careful scrutiny of the materials cited in

support of Gate City's characterization of Mr. Blaser's testimony
shows that this conclusion does not follow. In fact, Mr. Blaser's
testimony, particularly at pages 125-129 of his deposition, shows
just the opposite, that he did understand from Stan Jenkins and
Vaughn Cook that the Indemnity Agreement did protect him.

The

cited pages of Mr. Blaser's deposition are reproduced in Appendix
7 to this brief.
9.

The referenced affidavit of Blaise Johnson is completely

lacking in foundation for the point asserted by Gate City. It
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Gate City's Claimed Factual Inconsistencies, continued

does not appear that Mr* Johnson prepared or drafted the Indemnity
Agreements or that he was even employed by Gate City at the time
the Indemnity Agreements were prepared and signed.

No other

comparable source of relevant, admissible testimony is shown for
such conclusions.

Accordingly, this affidavit should be ignored

for the reasons previously noted at page 25, above.
10-12.

This

self-serving

description

of

Gate

City's

actions in 1984, while more or less accurate, simply does not
assist meaningfully in analyzing the issue at hand, because Gate
City's choice in 1984 to not pursue claims against Cook or C.C.
International for payment of the loans, whether made with or
without knowledge of that option, simply is too far removed in
time to be probative of Gate City's intent in late 1981, when the
Indemnity Agreements were prepared and signed.
Gate City's arguments simply miss their mark.
current

proposed

variant

interpretations

of

the

Even the
Indemnity

Agreement offered by Gate City at page 15 of its Brief are nothing
more than mere speculation.

There is little or no factual

evidence in the record to support those proffered interpretations,
which are offered for the first time on appeal.

In this regard,

Defendants note the holding of Territorial Savings and Loan
Association v. Baird, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 58 (Utah Ct. App.,
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September 26, 1989), to the effect that "evidence not available to
the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal."
Therefore, even if this Court were inclined to the view that
the Indemnity Agreements, considered alone, might be considered to
be ambiguous, the summary judgment entered by the trial court
should still be affirmed because all other evidence bearing on the
issue decided by the trial court shows that the summary judgment
motion of Defendants was correctly decided.
IV.
DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT
WITH THEIR ARGUMENT.
Repondents executed Uniform Real Estate Contracts, with C.C.
International at or shortly after the time that the indemnity
agreements were executed.

As Gate City admits (Plaintiff's brief

at 26), C.C. International executed Uniform Real Estate Contracts
with respect to each property

in question.

Therein, C.C.

International agreed "to assume" the mortgage or cause the same to
be assumed by a subsequent buyer. Exhibits "B"-"D" of Appendix 1
hereto.

While the later assumption by Kilburn was apparently

never completed, C.C. International's intent to assume the loans
could not have been more plainly stated.
That Defendants believed that assumptions had taken place is
clear and undisputed.

R. John Eyre Disposition at page 55;

Stephen L. Blaser Deposition at page 54; Third Affidavit of Vaughn
Cook, Record at 1049, at paragraph 5, Appendix 1 hereto.
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Gate

City argues that C.C. International only agreed to take the
property "subject to" the underlying mortgage and that "subject
to" does not include an assumption.
argument.

This is strictly a strawman

The Uniform Real Estate Contract clearly states that

the mortgages woul be assumed by C.C. International.

C.C.

International took the properties subject to the mortgages and in
fact expressly agreed to assume them, either absolutely, or in the
event that they were not assumed by Kilburn. Cook's execution of
the Indemnity Agreements fulfilled this contractual obligation of
C.C. International to Defendants.
The timing or sequence agrument asserted by Gate City is a
similar

red

herring.

Most

Repondents

themselves

independant knowledge at the time they signed

had

no

loan closing

documents, assumption agreements, and the uniform real estate
contracts as to whether any assumption of the Gate City loans had
already been completed because they had not seen the Indemnity
Agreements and were not parties hereto.

Since all of these

documents were typically signed by Defendants at one and the same
session, or at most within a span of only a day or two, they
simply

were

not

aware

of

the existence

of

the

Indemnity

Agreements, which only came to light during discovery long after
the suits were filed.
Defendants expected the mortgages to be assumed. The Uniform
Real Estate Contracts provide expressly that C.C. International as

-33-

buyer agrees to assume or cause them to be assumed.

Defendants

had been told that Kilburn would assume the loans.
Naturally, Defendants testified that they had been told that
Kilburn would assume the loans.

True to this, special language

was added to the Uniform Real Estate Contracts to provide that
"[i]t is understood that at such time as the underlying mortgage
is assumed by buyer [C.C. International] or its assigns [Kilburn],
then this contract shall be deemed fully executed and paid."
The Assumption Agreements
preliminarily

signed

by

referred

Defendants,

to by Gate

generally

City

and

the

loan

at

closings, are also not inconsistent with the Indemnity Agreements.
Those Assumption Agreements were never finalized nor delivered to
Gate City.

J. Clark Affidavit, Appendix 5 hereto.
V.
A NOVATION WAS PROVIDED FOR BY GATE
CITY'S OWN DOCUMENTS.

The primary case cited by Gate City for the proposition that
a novation must be intended by the parties is First American
Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 743 P.2d
(Utah 1987).

1193

That case states, at 1195: "a document could by its

unambiguous terms provide for a novation . . . "
This is precisely the case presented here.
and

trust deed

specifically

possibility of a novation.

contemplate

Gate City's note

and provide

for the

All that is required is a waiver of

the right to accelerate in connection with a transfer of the

-34-

property securing the loan coupled with a written assumption
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City, Note at paragraph 10.
The written Indemnity Agreements, accepted in writing by Stan
Jenkins for Gate city, fulfill this latter condition.

Nothing

more is required, except the waiver of the right to accelerate,
addressed more fully in Point VII below.
Since Gate City prepared or promulgated the documents with
the operative

language

assumptions is evident.

in place, its

intent

to allow the

The intent of C.C. International to

assume the loans is similarly evident in the Uniform Real Estate
Contracts.

Therefore, no presumptions are even necessary.

But

even if they were, in such a situation, the lower court was
entitled to use the tie-breaker doctrine of construing documents
against the drafter to justify its conclusion, where all available
evidence has been considered.

Allstate Enterprises

Inc. v.

Heriford, 772 P.2d 466, 469 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989).
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO FINDING
OF A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT.
Gate City claims that the lower court made a finding of fact
by ruling in favor of Defendants on the ground that copies of the
Indemnity Agreements were never located for two of the eleven
transactions. The facts, however, are nevertheless not disputed.
Vaughn Cook states that all of the transactions were handled and
treated the same. Record at 1052. No submission of any kind was
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ever presented

by Gate City to the effect that

Indemnity

Agreements did not exist with respect to these transactions. Gate
City had

the obligation to come forward with a submission to

place this fact at issue and failed to do so.
cannot complain of this now.

Therefore, it

Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P. 2d

1337, 1341-42 (Utah 1983).
Plaintiff Gate City also argues that the lower court made a
finding of fact that Gate City waived its right to accelerate.
Such a delineation is no bar to the granting of summary judgment
if the material facts are not in dispute.

Gate City offers not

one example of a material fact issue which would require a
several-week jury trial to determine.

If the facts are not in

dispute, waiver is a matter of law for the lower court's
determination.
VII.
THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENTS OF A RELEASE.
These Defendants have been released from the Notes and Trust
Deeds.

Each of the Trust Deeds and Promissory Notes contain

provisions calling for the release of the Defendant Borrowers upon
assumption of the mortgages.

Paragraph 17 of the Trust Deed and

Paragraph 10 of the Note provide as follows:
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all of
any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold
or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior
written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien of
encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the
creation of a purchase money security interest for
-36-

household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent
or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant
or (d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three
years or less not containing an option to purchase,
Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and
payable.
Lender shall have waived such option to
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and
the person to whom the Property is to be sold or
transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit
of such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of
Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If
Lender has waived the option to accelerate provided in
this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's successor in
interest has executed a written assumption agreement
accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release
Borrower from all obligations under this Deed of Trust
and the Note. (Emphasis added.)
As can be seen from this operative language, the Lender (Gate
City) "shall release the Borrower" (Defendants) "[i]f Lender has
waived the option to accelerate provided in . . . Paragraph 17,
and if Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender . . . . "
According to Gate City's own documents, therefore, Defendants
are released if (i) there has been a transfer of the property by
Defendants and Gate City has waived its right to not accelerate
the loan and (ii) the Borrower has executed a written assumption
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City.
A.

The Right to Accelerate upon Transfer was Waived, Because
Prior to Transfer, Gate City gave its Written Consent to the
Transfer.
The due-on-sale clause (Paragraph 17 of the Trust Deed)

cannot be exercised if Gate City gave prior written consent to the
transfer. Paragraph 17 provides in part that
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" [i]f all or any part of the property or an interest
therein is sold without Lender's prior written consent.
. . [the due-on-sale right may be asserted]. . . . "
Thus, it is only in the event that prior written consent is given,
the right to accelerate does not arise.

In this case, Gate City

gave prior written consent and, therefore, the right to accelerate
was waived at the outset, or more accurately, never existed.
The written consent Defendants refer to is contained in the
"Indemnity

Agreement"

wherein

Gate

City

agreed

C.C.

that

International obtained the loan from Gate City:
Whereas the Party of the First Part [C.C. International]
has obtained from Party of the Second Part [Gate City] a
first mortgage loan. . . . "
Record at 1070-1079, Exhibit 3 to Appendix 1 hereto.
Even if the Indemnity Agreement were nothing more than an
agreement to indemnify against mechanics liens' in consideration
of Gate City agreeing to the mortgage without showing exceptions,
it is obvious that by executing this sort of agreement with C.C.
International, Gate City recognized C.C. International

as a

mortgagor and could not have reserved a right to accelerate the
loan on the ground that C.C. International was the transferee. 3

^Moreover, the loan commitment agreement made by
Gate City Mortgage Company to Vaughn Cook and accepted
by him as president of Vaughn Cook & Associates on
September 28, 1981, pertaining to all eleven loans at
issue, specifically addressed all material terms of each
loan, including the interest rate of 18.75% per annum.
See Exhibit "A" to Third Cook Affidavit, Appendix 1 hereto.
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B.

If Gate City ever had a Right to Accelerate, it has Waived
itParagraph

17

provides

for

a

method

of

waiving

the

acceleration right in writing prior to transfer but leaves to
ordinary contract construction whether a given act constitutes a
waiver after transfer.

Defendants have argued above that the

Indemnity Agreement as interpreted by either the trial court or
Defendants constitutes a prior written waiver of the acceleration
clause.

Assuming, arguendo, that there had been no such waiver,

it is clear that if Gate City ever had the right to accelerate
based upon the due-on-sale clause, it subsequently waived it.
In each case the lender, Gate City, was aware that the
property was being transferred by the borrower upon execution of
the loan documents.

Vaughn Cook negotiated the terms of each of

these loans with Gate City.

Third Affidavit of Vaughn R. Cook,

dated March 13, 1989, at Paragraphs 2-3. Record at 1048-1049.
Stanley F. Jenkins, the loan officer for Gate City Mortgage
Company, who originated each of the subject loans for Gate City,
knew before the first loan closed that:
properties

(1) each of the

securing these loans was to be conveyed by the

Defendant Borrower at or shortly after closing, (2) after closing,
the properties would be used by Kilburn in its timeshare program,
and (3) Kilburn would be making all of the payments thereon.
Deposition of Stanley F. Jenkins, (11-15-88) at 62-63, also
(12/19/88) at 161-163, attached hereto as Appendix 6.
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Moreover,

all of this information concerning transfer by the Borrowers was
undisputedly conveyed to Mr. Jenkins1 superiors at Gate City in
North Dakota. Jenkins Deposition (12/19/88) at 149-153, attached
hereto as Appendix 6. Therefore, it is obvious that Gate City was
well-informed

of

the

intended

transfers

which

could

have

supposedly triggered any due-on-sale election had no prior consent
been given.
Before the loans were closed, Gate City's loan officer,
Stanley Jenkins, discussed the ramifications of the due-on-sale
clauses of the Notes and Deeds of Trust.
(2/6/86) at 21-28, Appendix 6 hereto.

Jenkins Deposition

Moreover, when Mr. Cook

expressed concern about the due-on-sale clause, Gate City's Mr.
Jenkins told him that due-on-sale clauses would not be invoked
since the assumption occurred with Gate City's approval.

Id. at

25.
The uncontroverted submissions are all to the effect that
Gate City did not communicate with Defendants after the loan
closings, but collected loan payments from either Kilburn directly
or Kilburn*s escrowed sale proceeds for approximately two and onehalf years.
attempt

to

Finally, it is obvious that Gate City never did
accelerate

the

loan

payments

based

upon

any

unconsented-to transfer.
Under such circumstances, no court would have allowed Gate
City to have enforced the acceleration rights of Paragraph 17.
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See, for example:

Clontz v. Fortner, 399 P.2d 949, 953, 954

(Idaho 1965) .
Co

Any Failure by Gate City to Execute a Written Document
Accepting the Credit of the Transferee Prior to the Sale is
Irrelevant,
Gate City argues that in order for the Borrower to be

released under Paragraph 17, it is necessary that prior to the
transfer, Lender Gate City accept the credit of the transferee and
approve the interest rate.
In this regard, it is undisputed that Gate City issued a loan
commitment containing the interest rate. This loan commitment was
issued not to Defendants, but rather to Vaughn Cook.

Secondly,

Gate City had accepted Cook or C.C. International's credit by
previously demonstrating its willingness to commit to make the
loans knowing full well that the property would be transferred by
C.C. International to Kilburn or timeshare purchasers and Kilburn
would make the payments. Thus, Gate City demonstrated its intent
to rely upon the credit of Kilburn. Moreover, Paragraph 17 of the
Trust Deed merely provides for waiver in advance of transfer.
Only in the event of waiver in advance is credit approval
required.

The provision relied upon states one way a borrower

could know in advance of an anticipated transfer whether Gate City
would opt to exercise the due-on-sale clause.

After the fact,

waivers are not foreclosed. See, e.g., PLC Landscape Construction
v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972).
Thus, Paragraph 17 provides a way for the lender to waive the
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right to declare the unpaid balance due and payable "prior to the
sale or transfer. . . . " (emphasis added), but gives no indication
whatever that this is the exclusive manner in which Gate City can
waive acceleration.

The manner in which the waiver occurs is not

an element to the release.
There are indeed many ways Gate City could choose to waive
the due-on-sale provisions after the transfer.

See, e.g.,

Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 757 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah
App. 1988).

For example, the Lender could enter into a written

release of the transferror.
demonstrate its waiver by:

A lender could also unequivocally
with knowledge that a transfer was

going to take place, participate in the closing where at the
transfers took place, and elect not to exercise any right it may
have had following the closings to accelerate based upon the dueon-sale clause for years following the closings, all the while
sending all notices, and looking exclusively, to transferee and/or
transferee's assignee of the property for payment.

Defendants

submit that either or both of these alternatives have been
satisfied.
D.

C.C. International Executed a Written Assumption Agreement.
Having established that Gate City either consented to the

transfer

or

waived

the

due-on-sale

acceleration

provision,

defendants submit that the second requirement to create a release
has also been established, i.e., Borrower's successor-in-interest
has

executed

a written

assumption
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agreement.

The

second

prerequisite to release of these Defendants under Paragraph 17 of
the Trust Deed is that Defendants' successor in interest and Gate
City execute a written assumption agreement.

Again, Defendants

submit that C.C. International entered into such an agreement to
assume the obligation to pay the mortgage.

In each case C.C.

International executed written Uniform Real Estate Contracts
respectively transferring each of the subject properties from
these Defendants to C.C. International. See, e.g., Appendix F to
Gate City's brief.

In each of the Uniform Real Estate Contracts,

C.C. International undertook (by language specially added to the
form) to assume the mortgage.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract

attached as Exhibit F to Gate City's brief, states, for example:
Buyer agrees to take the property subject to the
first mortgage to Gate City Mortgage dated December 30,
1981, and to assume, or cause the same to be assumed by
any subsequent purchaser.

6. It is understood that there presently exists
an obligation against said property in favor of Gate
City Mortgage (which buyer [C.C. International] agrees
to be responsible for) with an unpaid balance of
$200,000.00 as of December 30, 1981.

It is understood that at such times as the underlying
mortgage is assumed by buyer [C.C. International] or its
assigns . . . .
(Emphasis and brackets added.)
In one case, it is undisputed that Gate City's loan officer
agreed to obtain a Defendant-Borrower's signature on a Uniform
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Real Estate Contract bearing such assumption language for C.C.
International.

This document contained a provision whereby

International would assume the obligation.

C.C.

Third Cook Affidavit

at Paragraph 10.
To the question of whether Gate City accepted or agreed to
C.C. International's written assumption undertaking, the answer is
a resounding "yes."

Gate City drafted the Indemnity Agreements

wherein C.C. International is described as the one who obtained
the mortgage.
"Whesreas
the
party
of
the
first
part
[C.C.
International] has obtained from the party of the second
part [Gate City] a first mortgage loan for the principal
balance of $200,000 on the following described
property."
This

document

acknowledging

is

executed

that

C.C.

by

Gate

International

City
had

Mortgage,
obtained

thereby
a

first

mortgage loan from Gate City secured by the individual lots in
question.
Moreover, the "Indemnity Agreement" form executed by both
Gate City and C.C.

International contains expressly added language

whereby C.C. International agrees to pay the indebtedness:
"The obligation of the Party of the First Part
in this agreement shall extend to the mortgage
executed by, through or for the Party of the
First Part [C.C. International] of assigns on
the above premises. "
By extending C.C. International's obligation under the agreement
from just paying mechanics' liens and holding Gate City harmless
therefrom, to the obligations to pay the mortgage and indemnify
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Gate City therefrom, Gate City assented to the assumption by C.C.
International,

Thus, according to the language of Gate City's own

form of Trust Deed and Promissory Note, there can be no dispute
but that Gate City had the obligation to release the Defendants
because Gate City had given up its acceleration right and assented
to C.C. International's assumption of the mortgage obligations.
E.

Gate City's Reliance upon Paragraph 11 and Section
57-15-8 of Utah Code Annotated, is Misplaced.
Gate City claims it did not waive the rights of the due-on-

sale clause relying upon Paragraph 11 of the Trust Deed.

This

paragraph provides that:
Any forbearance by lender in exercising any right or
remedy hereunder otherwise afforded by applicable law
shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any
such right or remedy. The procurement of insurance or
the payment of taxes or other liens or charged [sic.] by
lender shall not be a waiver of lender's right to
accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness secured by
this deed of trust.
The doctrine of Eiusdem Generis provides that where general rules
follow

an enumeration

of

persons

or things, by words

of a

particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.
the

instant

case,

the

Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed.

general

statement

dealing

with

In

"any

forbearance by lender" is followed by words of a specific and
particular meaning, i.e.:
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"The procurement of insurance of the payment or taxes or
other liens or charges [sic] by lender shall not be a
waiver of lenders right to accelerate. . . . "
This category of factors deals exclusively with failure to pay
certain charges or taxes.

Rules of construction require the

general enumeration to be held to this class. Gate City's attempt
to

construe

this

provision

to

cover

due-on-sale-clause

or

acceleration rights cannot be justified.
Gate City's reliance upon Section 57-18-8 of the Utah Code
Annotated (as amended, 1986) is equally misplaced.

Gate City

claims that the procedure outlined must be followed to effect an
assumption.

In passing the Act dealing with assumptions of

residential properties, however, the Legislature stated:
The Legislature finds that clauses in instruments
repiresenting security interests in residential property
which allow a secured party to accelerate or mature an
indebtedness secured by property, or increase the
interest thereon upon the sale or transfer of the
property or upon assumption of the indebtedness, in
certain
circumstances, constitute
unreasonable
restraints on alienation to the detriment of the public
welfare. Utah Code Annotated, section 57-15-1 (1981, as
amended).
Gate City concludes without support or authority that this
Act provides for mandatory procedure before an assumption can be
effected.
untrue.

Plaintiff's brief at 40.

This conclusion is simply

Read in conjunction with section 57-15-8.5, Utah Code

Annotated and the Legislature's intent pressed in section 57-15-1,
it is clear that the provision is mandatory only if the lender
seeks to accelerate or raise the interest rate.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing material shows that the trial court properly
interpreted

the

Indemnity

Agreements, in finding

that they

satisfied all conditions necessary for a release of Defendants
from the subject loan obligations.

The trial court made no

improper determinations of facts material and necessary to this
decision, because Gate City failed to present adequate evidence of
any such dispute for any material fact. Accordingly, the award of
summary judgment in favor of Defendants should be affirmed.
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